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FERC-SEC Overlapping Jurisdiction
and the Ohio Power Litigation:
A Loss for Ratepayers
GARY D. LEVENSON*
INTRODUCTION
When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decided Ohio Power Co. v. FERC
(Ohio Power II) in February of 1992, it sparked considerable controversy among
public utilities, the customers they serve, and regulators. The court decided, on
remand from the Supreme Court, that the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) had exclusive junsdiction-to the disadvantage of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC)-to regulate interaffiliate sales of goods under the
Public Utility Holding Company Act. The conflict in the Ohio Power litigation
presages what could prove to be significant developments in the area of competing
jurisdiction between FERC and the SEC.2
This Comment sets forth the competing claims of the Ohio Power litigants in a
trio of cases before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals (on appeal and on remand)
and the Supreme Court, and it analyzes the reasoning given by these courts for
their decisions. In so doing, this Comment criticizes the judicial approaches taken
and calls on courts to decide future cases of this type with a closer eye toward the
underlying policies inherent in Congress's legislative scheme. Specifically, this
legislative scheme commands that more attention be paid to the interests of
ratepayers. The courts' refusals to recognize these interests display a sterile
approach to the law and a distorted reading of precedents in utility regulation.
Part I of this Comment reviews the steps leading up to the Supreme Court's
decision in the case, including regulatory activity by the SEC and FERC as well
as the first Ohio Power case decided by the D.C. Circuit. Part II focuses on how
the Supreme Court decided the case, looking at both the majority and the
concurmng opinions. It also briefly sets forth the D.C. Circuit's holding and
reasoning on remand in the second Ohio Power decision. In criticism of the court's
* J.D. Candidate, 1993, Indiana Umversity School of Law-Bloomington; M.P.P., 1990, University
of Michigan; B.A., 1986, University of Chicago. I would like to thank the members of the Indiana Law
Journal, especially Caroline Earle and Meredith Mann, for their editing. My thanks also go to Professors
Donald Gjerdingen and Ken Dau-Schmidt for their helpful suggestions on earlier drafts of this
Comment.
1. 954 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
2. At the time this writing went to press, the Supreme Court had denied FERC's petition for
certiorari. Id. The Court, therefore, left the problems raised in this Comment to be decided in a different
case.
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reasoning, this Comment discusses an alternative rationale upon which the court
could have relied.
Part III explores Ohio Power 11s holdings and critically appraises the decision
by relying on case precedents, legislative history, and the intended regulatory
functions of FERC and the SEC. In so doing, this Comment argues that the SEC
does not have the tools to protect consumers effectively. As a result, the D.C.
Circuit Court's grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the SEC will encourage corporate
tactics that will subvert the interests of ratepayers to the advantage of utility
security holders. Furthermore, Part III explains that the traditional economic
philosophy behind utility regulation justifies protecting utility ratepayers' interests
over those of utility investors.
Part IV argues that the ultimate effect of the Ohio Power litigation will be
confusion in the lower courts due to the ambiguous nature of the Supreme Court's
holding. Moreover, it asserts that the Supreme Court will likely revisit the issue.
This Comment explains that the Supreme Court's ambiguous holding arguably
allows the approaches of the D.C. Circuit to affect other areas of overlap between
FERC and the SEC to the detriment of consumers. This Comment also assesses
prospects for future litigation and legislative reform. This Comment concludes by
questioning the competency of the Supreme Court to decide highly specialized and
technical areas of law, such as those present in complex regulatory areas, and
suggests a serious inquiry be undertaken to determine whether a national court of
appeals for such issues should be established.
I. BACKGROUND: OHIO POWER I AND PRECEDING
REGULATORY ACTIVITY
In Ohio Power Co. v. FERCs (Ohio Power I), the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
overturned a FERC order calling for the Ohio Power Company (Ohio Power or
OPCO) to pay refunds to its customers because it had paid too much for coal
purchased from its subsidiary, Southern Ohio Coal Co. (SOCCO).4 Both companies
are affiliates within the American Electric Power Company, Inc., one of nine
holding companies registered under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
(Holding Company Act or PUHCA), and regulated as such by the SEC.5
3. 880 F.2d 1400 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power
Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990). This Comment refers to the first Ohio Power case, decided in 1989, as "Ohio
Power f' and to the second Ohio Power case, decided in 1992 on remand from the Supreme Court, as
"Ohio Power II." See supra note I and accompanying text.
4. Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,098, at 61,275 (Apr. 30,
1987).
S. Mums, Consumer Lawyers Fear Court Ruling Shifts Rate Authority to SEC, ELEcTRiC UTIL.
WK., Feb. 10, 1992, at II [hereinafter Ruling Shifts Rate Authority].
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Intervening on the side of FERC were several mumcipalities in Ohio and a group
of industrial customers.6
FERC originally acted in response to Ohio Power's application to increase its
rates to its wholesale customers in 1982. The Federal Power Act7 (FPA) instructs
FERC to rule on such applications by employing sections 205 and 206 of the FPA,
which mandate that wholesale electric rates be "just and reasonable."' However,
the SEC had already issued orders governing the transactions between OPCO and
SOCCO. Because OPCO is owned by a public utility holding company, the SEC
has jurisdiction over OPCO's transactions under PUHCA.9 Section 13(b) of
PUHCA makes transactions between "subsidiary compan[ies] of any registered
[public utility] holding company" unlawful unless approved by the SEC at terms
found to be "in the public interest or for the protection of investors or consum-
ers."'" Thus, SEC and FERC jurisdiction overlapped.
Because OPCO insisted that the SEC had jurisdiction, FERC's conflicting order
forced the D.C. Circuit Court to decide which agency had correctly interpreted the
overlapping directives of the FPA and the Holding Company Act. The court
decided in the SEC's favor and overturned the FERC order. Before discussing the
court's treatment of this case, the discussion below provides an overview of the
regulatory actions taken by the SEC and FERC.
A. The SEC's Regulatory Action
The seeds of the Ohio Power conflict were planted in 1971 when the SEC
approved the first of four transactions relating to coal sales between SOCCO and
OPCO. OPCO had entered into a capitalization relationship with its affiliate,
SOCCO, in order to secure a reliable source of high-quality coal for the entire
American Electric Power (AEP) system. This move came in response to the price
and supply upheaval that rocked the coal markets in the late 1960s and early
1970s." The SEC's action also anticipated the effect of the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1970 on the availability of lower sulfur coal. 2
6. The municipalities included fifteen villages and cities, collectively known as the Municipal
Wholesale Electric Customers of Ohio Power Company. The industrial customers included LCP
Chemicals & Plastics, Inc., Mobay Corporation, Olin Corporation, and PPG Industries, Inc. These
"customer intervenors" purchase electric power from Wheeling Power Company, which purchases all
its power from OPCO.
7. FPA §§ 201-206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824-824k (1988).
8. FPA §§ 205, 206(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824e(a).
9. PUHCA §§ 1-33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6 (1988).
10. PUHCA § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79m(b).
11. Ohio Power Company's Certificate as to Parties, Rulings, and Related Cases at 6, Ohio Power
Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 88-1293), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483
(1992).
12. Id.
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In its 1971 order, the SEC determined that OPCO could obtain coal from
SOCCO at a price "based on an amount equal to the actual cost" of coal
production, including a reasonable rate of return on OPCO's capital investment. 13
Similarly, in 1978 the SEC authorized OPCO to purchase coal so long as the price
"will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller."' 4 Two more SEC orders dealing
with various transactions between OPCO and SOCCO followed in 1979 and 1980,
the last of which also included the provision that sales of coal to AEP system
companies will "not exceed the cost thereof to the seller.""
B. FERC Responds
Under the SEC orders, the OPCO-SOCCO purchases allowed Ohio Power to pass
its coal costs entirely to its wholesale customers. Under FERC, utilities cannot pass
through to customers any portion of their coal costs that do not satisfy FERC's
"comparable market test."' 6 Thus, when OPCO filed with FERC for an increase
in its wholesale rates in 1982, the agency, acting under its mandate from the FPA
to protect ratepayers from excessive charges, sought to prevent this cost "pass-
through." FERC determined that Ohio Power had paid in excess of the market price
for coal from 1980 through 1986, including fifty percent more in 1980 and ninety-
four percent more in 1981,'" and had included these excess costs in its rates to its
customers. If FERC had applied the comparable market test, it would have forced
OPCO to sell power reflecting a lower market price for coal, even though the SEC
required Ohio Power to pay its affiliate the higher at-cost price.
C. The D.C. Circuit's Resolution of the Dilemma
In response to FERC's order, the D.C. Circuit Court was asked to resolve two
issues. First, did section 318 of the FPA,'8 which governs overlaps in jurisdiction
between the SEC and other agencies, divest FERC ofjurisdiction? Second, did the
FERC order violate the doctrine against illegal cost trapping?
13. Ohio Power Co., Holding Company Act Release [hereinafter HCA Release] No. 17,383 (Dec.
2, 1971).
14. In re Ohio Power Co., 14 S.E.C. Docket 928, 929 (Apr. 24, 1978).
15. In re Southern Ohio Coal Co., 19 S.E.C. Docket 1309 (Apr. 25, 1980).
16. Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico, 17 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,123, at
61,245-46 (May 6, 1981), affd sub nom. Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. FERC, 832 F.2d 1201
(10th Cir. 1987).
17. Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,098, at 61,291 n.87 (Apr. 30,
1987).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 825q (1988).
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1. Did Section 318 Divest FERC of Jurisdiction?
Section 318 of the FPA provides that, in the absence of an SEC-granted
exemption, the requirements of PUHCA govern when a company is subject both
to (1) a requirement of the SEC-administered PUIICA with respect to an
enumerated list of transactions and (2) a requirement of the FERC-administered
FPA "with respect to the same subject matter." 9 Judge Sentelle's opinion for the
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals explained that the FPA divested FERC of
jurisdiction because the SEC and FERC sought to regulate the "same subject
matter 20 in conflicting ways,2' thus triggering the SEC's exclusive jurisdiction.
Even though the Supreme Court later threw out the appellate court's basis for
resolving the jurisdictional issue, the analysis in Ohio Power I provides the.
groundwork for the competing views in this litigation.
Under section 318, the court of appeals also needed to determine whether the
respective requirements of FERC and the SEC were in conflict. If there was no
conflict between FERC and SEC requirements, there might not be any reason for
FERC to yield to the SEC. FERC, however, was unsuccessful in arguing that no
conflict existed between FERC and the SEC and that, therefore, section 318 was
not triggered.2U At issue was whether section 13(b) of PUHCA mandated "at cost"
pricing or merely permitted it. If it only permitted it, FERC's regulation to the
contrary created no dispute. On the other hand, if the SEC could authorize prices
19. 16 U.S.C. § 825q. A fuller quotation of the statute is as follows:
Conflict of jurisdiction
[if] with respect to the issue, sale, or guaranty of a security or assumption of obligation
or liability in respect of a security, the method of keeping accounts, the filing of reports,
or the acquisition or disposition of any security, capital assets, facilities, or any other
subject matter, any person subject to a requirement of [PUHCA] and to a requirement of
[the FPA], the [PUHCA] requirement shall apply , and such person shall not be
subject to the [FPA] requirement with respect to the same subject matter
Id. (emphasis added).
20. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 1), 880 F.2d 1400, 1405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990).
21. Id. at 1408.
22. The Supreme Court ruled that § 318 of the FPA did not apply substantively to the issues at
stake. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 77-85 (ruling that regulation of the recoverability or reasonableness of coal
charges in Ohio Power's wholesale rates was outside the scope of the enumerated list of items in § 318,
supra note 19, that would trigger the provision). The Supreme Court's view is explained fully at infra
notes 61-65 and accompanying text. The Court's decision not to rely on § 318 is questionable in itself
because both sides assumed that the proper construction of § 318 would decide which agency would
have jurisdiction. Thus, the Court decided an issue not raised by the litigants, which arguably runs
counter to the rules of Supreme Court practice. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
23. See Ohio Power 1, 880 F.2d at 1408 ("[FERC's argument] proceeds from a premise that
the [grant of authority to the SEC under] § 318 applies only when there is a present conflict between
SEC and FERC prescriptions").
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no other way, FERC's directives had no authority. This issue would prove
important later in Ohio Power II.
OPCO argued that section 13(b) mandates at-cost pricing for transactions
between public utility holding companies and their affiliates.24 Section 13(b) states
in. pertinent part that:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any subsidiary company of any registered holding
company to enter into [any service, construction, or sales contract with] any
associate company thereof except in accordance with [SEC rules and regula-
tions] necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
investors or consumers and to insure [the efficient and economic performance
of such contracts] for the benefit of such associate companies at cost, fairly and
equitably allocated among such compames.'
The court found the "at cost" language controlling. Yet the SEC's orders and
regulations (known as "Rules") indicate that the SEC ignores section 13(b) and
does not interpret this "at cost" language literally, but instead construes it to
establish only a price maximum. Therefore, the SEC orders do not foreclose the
possibility that FERC can override the "at cost" mandate in section 13(b).
As FERC argued in its 1987 order, "it is not clear that the SEC requires Ohio
Power to purchase coal from its subsidiary at cost"26 because the SEC's orders
regarding OPCO-SOCCO transactions appeared to lay down a less-than-ironclad
rule. For instance, the SEC orders state that charges for coal "will be based on ..
actual cost"27 and "will not exceed the cost thereof to the seller."'2 This language
does not appear to mandate a cost-based price where a market price would be
lower; rather it permits a price "up to a cost-based price."29 Thus, the SEC orders
impose a cost ceiling, but not a cost floor. Moreover, FERC cited the SEC's Rule
92, which provides that "the price for seller-produced goods between associated
companies may not exceed 'the price at which the purchaser might reasonably be
expected to obtain comparable goods elsewhere."' '0 Rule 92 thus implies that the
SEC may require market pricing if the market price is lower than cost.
FERC further argued that none of the SEC's orders regarding the OPCO-SOCCO
transactions cite section 13(b), or indicate that the SEC was "particularly
mindful"' of the '.at cost" language of the statute. For instance, none of the
24. Id. at 1411 (Mikva, J., concurnng).
25. PUHCA § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79m(b) (emphasis added).
26. Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,098, at 61,276 (Apr. 30, 1987)
(emphasis added).
27. HCA Release (Dec. 2, 1971), supra note I3.
28. Id.
29. Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,276.
30. Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1408 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 250.92(b) (1992)).
31. Id. at 1408.
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orders mentions the kind of purchase agreement between SOCCO and OPCO, nor
describes any element of costs other than the cost of capital.32 Nonetheless, the
court felt that section 318 of the FPA should determine the outcome. According to
this view, the SEC's order controlled since section 318 "in fact bars FERC
jurisdiction whenever a person is 'subject to a requirement[]' of PUHCA. 33
Since OPCO was subject to section 13(b)'s requirements, FERC was divested of
jurisdiction. It was irrelevant if the, SEC regulated the coal transactions without
careful attention to its own statutory and regulatory mandates. The court noted that
"[w]hether the SEC acquits itself well or ill is not [the court's] present concern."34
Thus, the court of appeals based its view of SEC-precedence on the ground that
section 318 of the FPA controls. But if section 318 does not apply, as the Supreme
Court later held,3" Ohio Power would have to demonstrate other, independent
reasons for the SEC to win. Perhaps the particular regulatory responsibilities of the
SEC justify its exclusive jurisdiction. On the other hand, sound public policy might
dictate that the regulatory responsibilities of FERC outweigh those of the SEC. In
any case, from at least an academic point of view, the stage was set for an
examination of the merits of the two agencies' regulatory approaches.
2. Did FERC Violate the Cost-Trapping Doctrine?
The second question before the court was whether the FERC order "trapped
costs" in violation of the doctrine that one agency cannot reform an agreement that
has already been regulated by another agency.36 In the landmark case of Nanta-
hala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,37 a state utility commission made a
different allocation between related companies of a fixed quantity of low-cost
power than had FERC at the wholesale level. Under the conflicting regulations, the
utility had to "pretend that it [was] paying less for the power it receive[d] I
under agreements not subject to [the state's] jurisdiction, than [was] in fact the
case."3 In other words, the retail-ratesetting state utility commission forced the
utility to sell an allocation of power containing a larger share of low-cost power
than FERC had approved for the utility's wholesale rates. Thus, the state's order
prdvented the utility from recovering the full costs of acquiring power under the
32. Id.
33. Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 825q (1988)).
34. Id. at 1409.
35. See supra note 22.
36. "Trapped costs occur when two governmental agencies tell the same person to do two different
things." Ruling Shifts Rate Authority, supra note 5, at I I (quoting Scott Hempling, attorney for
Environmental Action).
37. 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
38. Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 971, quoted in Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1409.
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FERC-approved scheme. A portion of the costs incurred by the utility in procuring
its power was therefore "trapped." 9 The Supreme Court would not let this stand
and held that the FERC-set rate was binding.' °
Though dressed in the clothing of a separate doctrine, the "trapped costs" issue,
stripped to its essentials, once again illustrates the jurisdictional conflict between
the two agencies' regulatory approaches. As FERC argued in Ohio Power I, 4' for
the "trapped costs" argument even to apply in the first place, the agencies in
question must be regulating the same subject matter, and in conflicting ways.42 To
illustrate the conflict, OPCO argued in its discussion of cost trapping in Ohio
Power II that "[t]he SEC cannot fulfill [its] congressional mandate if
FERC may with impunity iguore the SEC's implementation of Congress'
directive. 43 Consistent with its view that the regulatory directives of FERC and
the SEC conflicted, the Ohio Power I panel also found conflict in the context of
cost trapping.
According to the panel, cost trapping had occurred because the situation was
analogous to those in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg" and Mississip-
pi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore.4' Both cases involved
unsuccessful attempts by state utility commissions to disregard-in violation of
FERC mandates-the rate that wholesale sellers of electric power could receive.
The panel found FERC's relationship with the SEC in the instant case analogous
to the state regulators' relationship to FERC in Nantahala Power and Mississippi
Power Just as FERC's rates preempted the states' regulations and foreclosed cost
trapping, the SEC preempted FERC. The court found that its analysis of the cost-
trapping doctrine "buttressed" its decision,46 which was otherwise based solely on
its statutory interpretation of the FPA and PUHCA.
39. Id. at 971.
40. Id. at 971-72.
41. This Comment utilizes the Ohio Power II opinion to explain the trapped costs issue because it
was more squarely addressed in that opinion than in Ohio Power L
42. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 20-27, Ohio Power Co. v.
FERC (Ohio Power fl), 954 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 88-1293), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
One can detect the same underlying arguments by FERC on the trapped costs issue in Ohio Power L
See Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1409.
43. Reply Brief for Petitioner's Ohio Power Company on Remand at 17, Ohio Power 11 (No. 88-
1293).
44. 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
45. 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
46. Ohio Power , 880 F.2d at 1409.
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D. Judge Mikva 's Concurrence: A Contrary Statutory Interpretation
In Ohio Power 1, Judge Mikva concurred in the judgment of his colleagues, but
did not join in the court's reasoning. In stark contrast to the majority, he decided
that the orders of the two agencies did not conflict. He still found that FERC could
not prevail, however, because its order violated one of its own regulations, thus
barring the agency from imposing its market-rate test to the SOCCO-OPCO
transactions. This reasoning became crucial on remand because it provided an
alternative ground for granting exclusive jurisdiction to the SEC, regardless of
whether the FERC and the SEC regulatory actions really did conflict or even
whether the FERC order impermissibly trapped costs. Judge Mikva's construction
of the two agencies' orders represents a fundamentally different approach to
statutory interpretation.
Judge Mikva interpreted section 318 to divest FERC of jurisdiction only if a
person is subject to conflicting requirements of the FPA and the Holding Company
Act and the requirements are "with respect to the same subject matter.' 7 For
Judge Mikva, any application of section 318 logically required a conflict, "for even
if dual jurisdiction existed over the 'same subject matter,' there would be no reason
to favor the SEC over FERC if there was no conflict. 4 8 Judge Mikva held that
the second condition was met, for FERC and the SEC were "clearly regulating the
same subject matter, namely, the price of coal between Ohio Power and Southern
Ohio.149 He did not find that the first condition had been met, however, because
in his view the agencies' orders did not conflict.
In reaching this conclusion, Judge Mikva rejected OPCO's view that section
13(b) of PUHCA required a literal interpretation of the phrase "at cost." First, he
argued, Congress intended section 13(b) to avoid "excessive charges" resulting from
a lack of arm's length dealing between public utility holding companies and their
subsidiaries. ° Second, Judge Mikva found that the SEC interpreted section 13(b),
as demonstrated by its own Rule 90, to mean that interaffiliate transactions
contracts cannot be for "more than cost."' Thus, he reasoned that the SEC does
47. Id. at 1410-11 (quoting 16 U.S.C. 825q (1988)).
48. Id. at 1411.
49. Id.
50. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing PUHCA § 1(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b)(2) (1988)). For another
argument that Congress intended § 13(b) to avoid excessive charges in a similar case, see North Am.
Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 701 & n.ll (1946).
51. Ohio PowerI, 880 F.2d at 1411 (emphasis in original) (citing 17 C.F.R. § 250.90(a)(2) (1992)).
Judge Mikva also cited SEC Rule 92, 17 C.F.R. § 250.92(b), to illustrate that the SEC "even permits
a market-price test for the sale of goods between affiliates." Id.
14251993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
not prohibit a market-price test for such transactions. Third, Judge Mikva noted that
a review of the SEC's orders regarding the coal transactions showed that they only
limited the price of coal to cost as a ceiling, not cost as a floor. Ohio Power's view
that the orders impose a strict cost-based standard "reads too much into what
seems to be merely boilerplate language."52 Judge Mikva concluded that because
FERC could impose a market-price test without conflicting with the SEC's
statutory responsibilities, the two agencies were not at loggerheads." Since the
agencies were not in conflict, the regulatory target-OPCO--ould, by definition,
comply with both agencies.
Judge Mikva's approach to the relevant statutes shows no particular solicitude to
the underlying policies behind them. He relied mostly on the text of the statutes
and regulations involved, though he took note of a Supreme Court case that cites
the congressional findings underlying the passage of PUHCA.54 North American
Co. v. SEC supports his view that PUHCA is intended to protect against corporate
abuse by encouraging "open competition between public utility holding companies
and their subsidiaries."5 Judge Mikva found OPCO's view that the SEC should
have exclusive jurisdiction grossly misplaced, because reliance on the SEC's
approach as opposed to FERC's market-test would run counter to the pro-
competitive policies of PUHCA. Thus, Judge Mikva reached his decision at least
in part by relying on the legislative history to illuminate his understanding of the
legislative purposes of PUHCA.
While Judge Mikva found FERC's order statutorily permissible, he ultimately
sided with Ohio Power on the ground that FERC violated section 35.14(a)(7) of its
own regulations, which governs fuel price adjustment clauses in file rate schedules.
According to Judge Mikva, this regulation barred the agency from imposing its
market-price test. It provides:
52. Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1412. See supra notes 24-31 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the SEC's orders.
53. Notably, Judge Mikva made no comment on the cost-trapping rationale put forth by the
majority. See Ohio Power 1, 880 F.2d at 1410-14.
54. Id. at 1411 (citing to North Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 701 & n.l 1).
55. Id. at 1411. North American Co. was decided only eleven years after the 1935 passage of the
Holding Company Act. In a case where a holding company unsuccessfully challenged the Act's
authority to require a company to dispose of securities not connected with a primary integrated utility
system, PUHCA § I l(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1), the Court relied, inter alia, on exhaustive and
comprehensive congressional findings referred to in § 1(b) of PUHCA that reported the extensive abuses
of holding companies. North Am. Co., 327 U.S. at 701 & n.l 1 (explaining that unfettered control of
securities by holding companies leads to "unreasonable fees"). Thus, Judge Mikva's citation-with a
parenthetical explaining Congress's findings-shows some recognition of the regulatory purposes at
which PUHCA was directed. Ohio Power 1, 880 F.2d at 1411.
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Where a utility purchases fuel from a company-owned or controlled source, the
price of which is subject to the jurisdiction of a regulatory body, such cost shall
be deemed to be reasonable and includable in the adjustment clause5 6
The dispute focused on the meaning of the word "deemed" in this context. FERC
argued that the language created only a "rebuttable presumption" of reasonable-
ness,57 but OPCO argued, and Judge Mikva agreed, that it established a "conclu-
sive presumption."" This issue, though important to the outcome in Ohio Power
II, is not, however, relevant to the topic at hand. The process of interpreting one
of FERC's regulations yields no doctrinal guidelines on how to resolve conflicts
between FERC and the SEC in general, or with regard to interaffiliate transactions
of public utility holding companies in particular. FERC can simply respond to an
adverse ruling by changing its regulations, if it so desires.59 Because of the
relative unimportance of the section 35.14(a)(7) issue, the body of this Comment
does not address the courts' treatment of it.6°
Following the appellate court's ruling that FPA section 318 divested FERC of
jurisdiction, the municipalities, FERC, and the customer intervenors thereafter
appealed to the Supreme Court.
56. Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1412 (emphasis in original) (quoting 18 C.F.R. § 35.14 (a)(7)
(1986)).
57. Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,098, at 61,278-79 (Apr. 30,
1987); Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 31-41, Ohio Power Co. v. FERC
(Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992) (No. 88-1293); see
also Brief on Remand for Intervenors (1) Municipal Wholesale Electric Customers of Ohio Power
Company and (2) Industrial Intervenors at 26-34, Ohio Power II (No. 88-1293).
58. Ohio Power I, 880 F.2d at 1412; Reply Brief for Petitioner Ohio Power Company on Remand
at 26-41, Ohio Power 11 (No. 88-1293).
59. To the extent that rescinding a regulation and promulgating a new one may be ultra vires with
respect to the mandate of Congress, a probing inquiry into this matter is beyond the scope of this
Comment. For a discussion of this topic, see Marianne K. Smythe, Judicial Review of Rule Rescissions,
84 COLuM. L. Rav. 1928, 1937-40 (1984).
60. On the other hand, the issues of conflicting regulatory directives and cost trapping go to the
heart of the statutory interpretation of both the FPA and the Holding Company Act. In short, they have
broad significance for future jurisdictional conflicts that may arise.
Judge Mikva resolved the issue by relying primarily on the fact that most courts construing the word
"deemed" when employed in statutory law have found that it established a conclusive presumption.
Ohio Power 1, 880 F.2d at 1413 (citing H.P Coffee v. Reconstruction Corp., 215 F.2d 818, 822 (Emer.
CL App. 1954); Kyzar v. Califano, 597 F.2d 68, 71 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1980);
Kohn v. Myers, 266 F.2d 353, 357 (2d Cir. 1959)); Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322,326-27 (1953).
On remand, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed Judge Mikva's construction of the word
"deemed" in holding that § 35.14(a)(7) barred FERC from applying its market-pnce test, see infra notes
75-76 and accompanying text, and also cited Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216,218 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and
Forrester v. Jerman, 90 F.2d 412, 413 (D.C. Cir. 1937), as further evidence that "deemed" created a
conclusive presumption. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 783 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
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II. ARCADIA, OHIO V OHIO POWER CO..
THE SUPREME COURT'S DISPOSITION OF THE ISSUES
A. The Opinion of the Court
In the Supreme Court, the appellants challenged the holding of the court of
appeals that section 318 of the FPA divested FERC of jurisdiction. The appellants
conceded that the two agencies were regulating the same subject matter, but argued
that section 318's rule of SEC precedence takes effect only when the regulatory
obligations of the two agencies conflicted, and that no actual conflict occurred in
this case.
The Supreme Court construed the statute in a much different way. Writing for
a unanimous Court, Justice Scalia reasoned that the language of section 318 did not
apply to the settlement of a jurisdictional battle between FERC and the SEC over
the acquisition of SOCCO coal by Ohio Power.6' Justice Scalia arrived at this
conclusion by noting that the subject matter regulated by the respective agencies
was different.62 First, FERC's rate requirement was imposed with respect to
electric power, which was a different subject matter than the SEC's regulation of
OPCO's acquisition of SOCCO.6 3 Thus, FERC's order was outside the scope of
section 318, and the jurisdictional battle would require other methods for
resolution.' Second, Justice Scalia observed that even if FERC's rate order
61. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990). The Consumer Federation of America,
the American Public Power Association, Environmental Action, and the Indiana Municipal Power
Agency filed as amict curiae on the Supreme Court level on behalf of FERC, the municipalities, and
customer intervenors were The Registered Holding Company Group filed an amicus brief for OPCO.
62. See id. at 85.
63. Id. Scalia wrote that OPCO's acquisition of SOCCO coal, or its capitalization of SOCCO as an
affiliate, might be encompassed under the statutory language of § 318, "acquisition or disposition of any
security, capital assets, facilities, or any other subject matter." Id., 16 U.S.C. § 825q. The interpretive
rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind, class, or nature), however, prevented the inclusion of electric
power as "other subject matter" at the end of a list that includes securities, capital assets, and facilities.
Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 84-85. The Court cautioned against reading statutory language enumerating a
specific list of subjects in an expansive manner that "swallows" or "renders entirely superfluous"
the preceding language. Id. at 78-79. Furthermore, the legislative history showed no conclusive
indication that the phrase "other subject matter" was meant to be a general conflicts provision. Id. at 86
n. I (Stevens, J., concurrng).
64. Note the radical difference between this approach and Judge Mikva's holding. Judge Mikva
ruled that the two agencies were regulating the same subject matter, for example, the "price of coal."
Thus, he rejected the formalistic approach (per Scalia) of looking at the "form" of the transactions and
instead focused on the "effect." To focus on "form" would require the view that FERC's order regulates
"rates" and the SEC order regulates the "price of coal." Judge Mikva recognized that FERC and the SEC
were regulating the same thing because FERC's regulation imposed a genuine burden upon Ohio Power
in recovering its coal costs. For Judge Mikva, the SEC did not possess the statutory authority to prevent
FERC from using its market-test. This result, while not explicitly stated in his concurrence, obtains
(setting aside for the moment FERC's violation of § 35.14(a)(7)) because of the policies behind the
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qualified under section 318, it was "with respect to a different subject matter from
(and not, as section 318 requires, 'with respect to the same subject matter' as) the
acquisition of SOCCO. '65 Thus, even using the approach of the D.C. Circuit-for
example, deeming FERC's regulation to fall within section 318-the high Court
reached a different conclusion.
The Supreme Court, having disposed of the section 318 analysis, remanded the
case to the court of appeals to decide two questions. First, the court of appeals was
to determine whether FERC had violated its own regulations, as Judge Mikva had
argued. Second, and more controversially, the lower court was to decide whether
the "FERC-prescribed rate is not 'just and reasonable' because it 'traps' costs
which the government itself has approved."'
Although the Court repudiated Ohio Power Iby deciding that FERC and the SEC
were not regulating the same subject matter, the Court viewed the cost-trapping
issue separately. On its surface, this would appear to be a curiously ambiguous
formulation. Apparently, the Court felt that each agency could regulate the utility's
recovery of coal costs differently, without regard to the other, and not violate the
conflict of jurisdiction provisions of section 318. Yet, if cost trapping occurred,
they could not both regulate, and one agency would have to cede to the other.67
As this Comment argues below, this formulation is not good law and will confuse
lower courts. This ambiguity in part stems from the Court's failure to take into
account the legislative purposes behind the statutes. Justice Stevens emphasized this
in his concurrence. In a more sweeping view, Justice Stevens believed that the
FERC and the SEC orders did not collide in this case.
exercise of FERC's regulatory power. Judge Mikva tacitly endorsed the view that the scheme of federal
legislation gives FERC precedence over the SEC in ratemaking matters.
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, viewed the regulation of "rates" as a separate animal from the
regulation of the "price of coal." He thus adhered to a formal reading of the statute by deciding that
FERC's regulatory target was a different subject matter than the SEC's, and therefore the statute did not
apply. This is a perfectly reasonable reading of the statute if one believes that FERC has separate
responsibilities from the SEC and thereby should not lose this jurisdictional battle to it. Justice Scalia's
approach, however, prevented him from considering the possibility that the statutory scheme gave FERC
precedence. He instead concluded that the lower court should decide who wins, without any particular
guidance from the high Court. See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. If not a formalistic
approach, Justice Scalia's aversion to interpreting the underlying policies of statutes at least shows his
disdain for "judicial lawmaking" or for inquiring into legislative history. For an in-depth discussion of
Justice Scalia's "text- and rule-based" approach to statutory interpretation-to the exclusion of legislative
purpose-see William N. Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 650-56 (1990);
William D. Popkm, An "Internal" Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory Interpretation, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1133, 1138, 1156, 1160 (1992).
65. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 85.
66. Id.
67. The Court specifically declined to express an opinion about whether cost trapping had occurred,
or whether § 35.14(a)(7) was violated. See id.
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B. Justice Stevens's Concurrence:
A Serious Regard for Legislative Purpose
In a concumng opinion joined by Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens argued more
pointedly that section 318 did not apply In contrast to the opinion of the Court, his
argument ultimately relied on the legislative purposes behind the passage of the
relevant statutes. Justice Stevens agreed with the Court that the statutory language
rendered the statute inapplicable to the particular jurisdictional conflict up for
review. But Justice Stevens went further: he emphatically argued that there was "no
risk" of conflict between the two agencies' requirements in this case.6" According
to Justice Stevens, the SEC orders only limited what portion of its costs Ohio
Power could pass through to its customers. Thus, Ohio Power was able to comply
with both the SEC and FERC.69 Justice Stevens's analysis relied on legislative
intent, noting that a contrary reading of section 318 "would create a gap in the
regulatory scheme that Congress could not have intended 70 in light of the
purposes behind the passage of the Holding Company Act.
PUHCA, Stevens noted, empowered the SEC to regulate interaffiliate transactions
in order to eliminate potential conflicts of interest. The SEC has expertise in
"financial transactions and corporate finance."'" The FPA, on the other hand, gave
FERC the authority to regulate the wholesale interstate sale and distribution of
electricity FERC, appropriately enough, had the "proper technical expertise to
regulate energy transmission [one principle goal of which] is to ensure that the
rates customers pay are 'just and reasonable."'7" Chiding the court of appeals'
view that the SEC took precedence, Stevens declared that PUHCA's purpose is to
"supplement [but] not supplant the FPA. Yet, this is the effect that the court of
appeals opinion would have in those areas where the two agencies overlap. 73
68. Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that the legislative history did not illuminate the
meaning of the phrase "other subject matter." Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring); see
supra note 63.
69. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citing FPA §§ 205, 206(a), 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e(a) (1988)); see also Gulf States Util.
Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973) (delineating-according to Justice Stevens-the differing regulatory
goals of the two agencies). Gulf States observes that the Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat.
803, had
two primary and related purposes: to curb abusive practices of public utility holding companies
by bringing them under effective control [under PUHCA, Tit. I, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79a to 79z-6,
whose administration is entrusted to the SEC], and to provide effective federal regulation of
the expanding business of transmitting and selling electric power in interstate commerce [under
the FPA, Tit. II, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a to 828c, whose administration is entrusted to FERC].
Gulf States, 411 U.S. at 758.
73. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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In light of Justice Stevens's observation that the regulatory missions of the two
agencies diverge, FERC would prevail in this dispute because the case involved
the regulation of rates. Justice Stevens concluded that the court of appeals decision
would ultimately allow public utility holding companies to avoid regulatory
requirements applying to electric power wholesalers in general merely because of
corporate structure. For example, PUHCA requirements would shield utilities
owned by holding companies from FERC's "substantial technical regulation."'74
Thus, if certain aspects of OPCO-SOCCO-like transactions became impervious to
FERC regulation, a regulatory gap would emerge. As Justice Stevens interpreted
the statutes, Congress intended these utilities to be subject to "both SEC and FERC
as much as practical." Justice Stevens, then, drew his conclusions from a clearly
defined view of the distinct legislative purposes behind the drafting of the
respective statutes.75
In light of Justice Stevens's rich reliance on legislative history, the majority
opinion gave Ohio Power reason to feel relieved, despite the reversal-and FERC,
correspondingly agitated-because the opinion accorded broad latitude to the court
of appeals to decide anew the questions of compliance with FERC regulations and
cost trapping. FERC and the municipalities could not rejoice at the reversal
because, given such broad latitude, the lower court could easily decide in favor of
Ohio Power again.
C. Ohio Power II. FERC-Two-Time Loser
Called upon by the Supreme Court to decide the two questions of compliance
with FERC regulations and cost trapping, the D.C. Circuit found in favor of Ohio
Power and the SEC on both issues. The court of appeals found, in the first part of
a two-part analysis, that FERC violated section 35.14(a)(7) of its regulations. 76
According to the panel, this regulation, properly obeyed, precluded FERC from
imposing its market-price test.77 Second, in a section entitled, "Reconciliation of
the Overlapping Regulatory Authorities," the panel found that even though section
318 did not govern the case, there was nonetheless an "unavoidable conflict[]"
between the SEC's authority under section 13(b) of PUHCA and FERC's authority
74. Id.
75. In contrast to Justice Scalia's reliance on statutory text, Justice Stevens characteristically uses
the "common law case by case approach," relying on legislative intent and the historical context of the
statute's enactment. For more discussion on this topic, see William D. Popkin, A Common Law Lawyer
on the Supreme Court: The Opinions of Justice Stevens, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1087, 1105-10; Popkin, supra
note 64, at 1171 (contrasting common-law and textualist approaches).
76. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 782-84 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113
S. Ct. 483 (1992).
14311993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.7 The panel also found that the conflict
resulted in impermissible cost trapping, for FERC's order "undeniably affect[ed]
the economic relationship between Ohio Power and SOCCO, a relationship
approved by, and under the jurisdiction of, the SEC."79
The court of appeals erred because it misinterpreted the cost-trapping prece-
dents8o and because SEC exclusive regulation is insufficient and contrary to the
legislative scheme of Congress.8 ' Ultimately, this Comment argues, the decision
lacks coherence. One justification for the court's decision exists, however. The
court could have used a "process-oriented" approach to deny FERC jurisdiction.82
Though unmentioned in the court opinions in this case and discussed only briefly
by the litigants, 3 there is a good argument that, under a process-onented model
of regulation, FERC's market test should not apply to utilities owned by holding
companies.
FERC's market test derived from its 1981 opinion in Public Service Co. of New
Mexico, 84 which held that a utility with a captive coal operation had to refund
ratepayers if it could have purchased cheaper coal than its own. But since the New
Mexico utility was not PUHCA-regulated, and, therefore, not part of a holding
company,85 it is at least debatable whether FERC's New Mexico opinion applied
equally to PUHCA-regulated utilities.
Congressional hearings in 1982 on the need to amend or repeal PUHCA revealed
that the SEC and FERC were applying different standards in the area of interaffili-
ate transactions.86 Therefore, Congress was aware of the differential treatment. So,
the argument goes, if Congress had wanted to change this scenario, it would have
done so, especially in view of the purpose behind its 1982 hearings. Because
78. Id. at 784. FPA §§ 205-206 mandate that FERC set rates that are "just and reasonable." FPA
§§ 205-206, 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a) & 824e(a) (1988).
79. Ohio Power II, 954 F.2d at 782-84 (citing Nantahala Power & Light v. Thornburg, 476 U.S.
953, 971).
80. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
81. See infra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
82. Under the process-oriented approach, an agency's regulatory practice should be adhered to in
successive situations if Congress acquiesced to it. Any deviations from the regulatory scheme are
illegitimate because if Congress did not approve the deviation, it implicitly endorsed the preexisting
regulatory practice.
83. OPCO Bnef in Opposition of Cert. Petition at 14, Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S.
73 (1990) (No. 89-1283).
84. 17 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,123, at 61,245-46 (May 6, 1981), afd sub
nom. Public Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. FERC, 832 F.2d 1201 (10th Cir. 1987).
85. Public Serv. Co. of N.M., 17 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,246.
86. OPCO Brief in Opposition of Cert. Petition at 11 n.8, Arcadia (No. 89-1283) (citing The Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935: Hearings of the Sub-Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97 Cong.,
2d Sess. 583 (June 9, 1982)).
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Congress did not act to alter this differential treatment, it must have wanted no
changes.
Despite the problems with this decision-making rationale, 7 it is more coherent
than the court's rationale. The process-oriented approach offers a more coherent
justification for the outcome in Ohio Power H because it is rooted in bedrock
principles of democracy and a healthy distrust of the regulatory state. It is
democratic because it relies on Congress's action (or inaction) as the representa-
tives of the people. If Congress had an opportunity to act but did not, the fullest
expression of democracy must be to follow Congress's inaction. "Distrust of the
regulatory state" is essentially a restatement of democratic principles. Since
government bureaucrats are not elected, adhering to their ever-evolving interpreta-
tions of statutes would threaten democracy. Before regulators can be allowed to act,
democratic principles require a consensus among elected leaders. This view is
coherent, and preferable to the misreading of precedents and legislative history that
occurred in Ohio Power 11. However, while coherent, the process-oriented approach
is unsatisfying because it does not articulate which policies the two agencies should
pursue. It relies on a mechanical formula rather than policy analysis. The process-
oriented approach, therefore, while somewhat more coherent, must also be rejected.
III. OHIO POWER II: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Parts I and II of this Comment explained the chronology of events and
highlighted the main issues in this litigation, which resulted in the Ohio Power II
decision. Part III analyzes and critiques both the court of appeals' and the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Section A asserts that the court of appeals' cost-trapping
rationale is inappropriate because it misinterprets the Supreme Court's prior
understanding of this doctrine. Section B shows that the court of appeals'
preference for exclusive SEC jurisdiction derives from an erroneous view that
interaffiliate transactions uniquely deserve cost-based pricing. Section B also argues
87. Congressional inaction does not ordinarily provide insights into legislative intent. See, e.g., Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-600 (1981) (drawing conclusions from congressional
inaction, but noting that this is rarely possible); Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 694 n.i i (1980) (rejecting
congressional inaction as a basis for ignonng plain meaning and legislative history); Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381-82 n.i 1 (1969) (commenting that "unsuccessful attempts
at legislation are not the best guides to legislative intent"). It takes an extraordinary claim of legislative
acquiescence for a federal agency's construction of an existing statute to be controlling. See Bob Jones
Univ., 461 U.S. at 600 (upholding agency's rulings because Congress was "acutely aware" of the issue
through repeated failure to pass legislation that would achieve contrary result). No such evidence was
proffered by Ohio Power regarding the extent of legislative acquiescence. Moreover, there is nothing
in FERC's New Mexico opinion that indicates an intent to limit the scope of its ruling. The FPA
contains no express limitations on FERC's authority to mandate a market test for captive coal purchases,
whether the regulatory target is under PUHCA or not.
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that the SEC does not have the tools to adequately protect consumers. Section C
focuses on the legislative history of the statutes, and demonstrates that exclusive
FERC jurisdiction is consistent with Congress's intent that the interests of
ratepayers be protected over those of utility investors. In the end, SEC jurisdiction
will not provide the sufficient regulatory tools. Section D shows that economic
regulation favoring ratepayers over investors is further justified because it is sound
economic policy
A. The Advent of an Equitable Cost-Trapping Doctrine:
A Misplaced Endeavor
The Ohio Power II court's approach to cost trapping resembles the approach used
in Ohio Power L This approach warrants scrutiny because the precedents on cost
trapping call for a narrow applicability Nantahala Power & Light Co. v.
Thornburg,"s which the court relied upon to illustrate cost trapping, dealt with a
state regulatory commission acting in contravention of a FERC mandate. The
Nantahala Power case held that FERC preempted the state regulation. Thus this
holding derives not from a rule preventing a utility from charging a rate higher than
that "approved" by a regulatory agency-trapping the utility's costs-but rather
from federal preemption of state authority in certain regulatory areas. In other
words, FERC's rates preempted the state's under the Supremacy Clause. Nantahala
Power is best viewed not as a battle between two equivalent regulatory entities, but
as "'a matter of enforcing the Supremacy Clause' in the state-federal [ratemaking]
context."89
As the Supreme Court explained in Nantahala Power, the trapped-cost
principle" arises from the "filed rate" doctrine, which essentially restates the
Supremacy Clause in the utility ratemaking context. The filed-rate doctrine holds
that "interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC must be given
binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates."'
88. 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
89. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 22, Ohio Power Co. v. FERC
(Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 88-1293) (quoting Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at
963), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
90. The "trapped cost principle" was first articulated by Justice O'Connor in her opinion for the
Court in Nantahala Power. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 22, Ohio
Power I, (No. 88-1293) (citing Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 970, 972).
91. Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 962. The filed-rate doctrine has a long pedigree beginning with
Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 341 U.S. 246 (1951), which upheld
the ratemakings of FERC's predecessor, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), against a challenge by
a utility in federal court. See also Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) (extending
filed-rate doctrine to decisions of state courts); Chicago & North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick &
Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311 (1981) (filed-rate doctrine as applied to actions of Interstate Commerce
Commission assisted in the enforcement of the supremacy of federal law).
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Likewise, in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, the Court
observed that the filed-rate doctrine bound the state under the Supremacy Clause
to adhere to FERC's mandate.
92
Seen in this light, cost trapping is more properly associated with a state-federal
tug of war, illustrated by the states' attempts to alter the scheme of regulation
established by FERC. Both Nantahala Power and Mississippi Power can fairly be
read as an application of the constitutional principle that a federal statute
"occup[ies] [the] field"93 to the exclusion of state law when the pervasiveness of
federal regulation indicates that Congress intended the preemption. Both Nantahala
Power and Mississippi Power represent the view that the FPA occupies the field
with respect to interstate power rates with certain exceptions;94 the Supreme
Court's reference to cost trapping in these cases was a superfluous observation."
Beginning with Narragansett Electric Co. v. Burke, 381 A.2d 1358 (R.I. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
972 (1978), state courts began to apply the filed-rate doctrine to decisions of state utility commissions
and state courts that concerned matters addressed in FPC (FERC's predecessor) ratemakings for
electricity. Accord Eastern Edison Co. v. Department of Pub. Utils., 446 N.E.2d 684 (Mass. 1983).
Narragansett specifically held that state utility commissions are precluded from redetermining supply
or fuel costs approved by FERC. The Nantahala decision expanded the doctrine when it ruled that
neither costs nor "cost allocations" approved by a federal agency "could be relitigated by a state
authority." Diane S. Boiler, Filing Away at the Filed-Rate Doctrine, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 1, 1992,
at 33.
92. 487 U.S. 354, 371 (1988) (citing Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 963). Mississippi Power
expanded the doctrine yet again by ruling that "capacity purchases" as well as fuel purchases could not
be reviewed by states if already approved by federal authorities. Boiler, supra note 91, at 33.
93. Schnezdewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 299-300 (1988) (describing preemption of
Natural Gas Act of 1938 over state law); see also Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230
(1947).
94. The Pike County exception holds that states can determine that a particular quantity of power
procured by a utility is imprudent. Pike County Light & Power Co. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n,
465 A.2d 735, 737-38 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 1983); accord Nantahala Power, 476 U.S. at 972 (dicta). For
a brief explanation of Pike County and other exceptions to the filed-rate doctrine, see Boiler, supra note
91, at 33-35. Fora more detailed discussion of Pike County, see James E. Hickey, Jr., Mississippi Power
& Light Company: A Departure Pointfor the Extension of the "Bright Line" Between Federal and State
Regulatory Jurisdiction over Public Utilities, 10 J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y 57, 79-82 (1989).
95. Notably, virtually all available scholarly commentary that discusses Nantahala Power or
Mississippi Power describes them in terms of FERC preemption of state regulation or deference to
FERC in ratemaking matters, but not in terms of a general notion of impermissibly trapping the costs
that a utility previously incurred. See, e.g., S. Candice Hoke, Preemption Pathologies and Civic
Republican Values, 71 B.U. L. REV. 687, 689-90 & n.24 (1991) (noting that Nantahala Power illustrates
an ever-increasing trend toward more preemption of state action by federal statutes under the Supremacy
Clause); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Public Utility Regulatory Takings: Should the Judiciary Attempt to Police
Political Institutions?, 77 GEo. L. J. 2031, 2034 & nn. 23-24 (1989) (refemng to Nantahala Power and
Mississippi Power as cases where "state utility rate-making actions [were held] unconstitutional under
the Supremacy Clause"); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power,
72 VA. L. REV. 1183, 1189 n.45 (1986) (stating that Nantahala Power demonstrates that FPA and
Supremacy Clause preempted state agency's attempt to prohibit utility from recovering FERC-approved
rate); Joseph P. Tomain & Constance D. Burton, Nuclear Transition: From Three Mile Island to
Chernobyl, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 363, 413 n.178 (1987) (arguing that Nantahala Power supports
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Viewed in this way, the two cases stand for deference to FERC in ratemaking
matters, deference that FERC claimed it deserved in the Ohio Power case.
Moreover, Ohio Power did not cite cost-trapping cases outside the context of a
FERC-state regulator conflict.
Given the narrow applicability of Nantahala Power and Mississippi Power,
FERC could plausibly cede jurisdiction to the SEC under an "'equitable' notion of
cost trapping by analogy. ' 96 Ironically, FERC raised this point in its brief, perhaps
with the thought that conjuring up a novel theory of an "equitable remedy" would
suggest its own absurdity.97
A cost-trapping analogy could derive from the view that FERC "affect[ed] the
economic relationship"9' between OPCO and SOCCO that was previously
regulated by another federal agency. Similarly, one could posit that Ohio Power
"reasonably reli[ed]" on "'a governmental assurance, possibly implicit in the SEC
approvals, that Ohio Power will be permitted to recoup the cost of acquiring and
operating SOCCO."' '
The analogy fails, however, because FERC's effect on the economic relationship
between OPCO and SOCCO was not significant since "[g]ovemments do things all
the time that affect economic relationships" between entities."° Furthermore, no
reliance could reasonably be inferred on the part of OPCO to justify SEC
preemption on equitable grounds. The "plain language" of the SEC's orders and
rules indicated that the SEC was only concerned with a ceiling price, thus negating
any reasonable reliance by OPCO on the SEC's orders to guarantee recovery of its
proposition that "under the doctrine of preemption, federal regulation of electricity supersedes state
regulation"); Jonathan Galst, Note, "Phony" Intent?: An Examination of Regulatory-Preemption
Jurisprudence, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 108, 134, 136-37 (1992) (noting that Nantahala Power and
Mississippi Power show that investment is tied to FERC-approved interstate agreement); Note,
Preemption and Regulatory Efficiency in Federal Energy Statutes, 103 HARV. L. RE'V. 1306, 1315 n.84
(1990) ("[S]tates may not challenge the reasonableness of FERC's ratesetting or power allocation
decisions."); see also Hickey, supra note 94, at 76-80 (observing that Nantahala Power and Mississippi
Power show that filed-rate doctrine preempts state action); James E. Norris, The Shrinking of State
Ratemalang Power-Lessons from Grand Gulf, PUB. UTIL. FORT., Aug. 4, 1988, at 45 (reporting that
Mississippi Power and Nantahala Power decisions hampering state regulatory efforts); cf. In Re Public
Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 90 B.R. 575, 583 n.10 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1988) (citing Mississippi Power
to illustrate that FERC regulation of wholesale rates would preempt a state's attempt to regulate same).
96. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 20, Ohio Power Co. v. FERC
(Ohio Power 17), 954 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir.) (No. 88-1293), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
97. Id. The ironic aspect is that it would seem more natural for OPCO to have argued this point,
but it did not do so in either its Brief on Remand or its Reply Brief.
98. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 483 (1992).
99. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 20, Ohio Power 11 (No. 88-
1293) (quoting Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 85 (1990)).
100. Ruling Shifts Rate Authority, supra note 5 (quoting Scott Hempling, attorney for Environmental
Action).
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cost of coal.' As Justice Stevens observed, Congress could not have intended
to immunize such transactions from FERC's scrutiny. 0 2
The grant of exclusive SEC jurisdiction cannot be justified, therefore, simply on
the grounds of cost trapping. Yet, Ohio Power II-without explicit mention-in
fact adopted what can only be described as an "equitable" doctrine of cost trapping.
This decision misconstrues the specific meaning of cost trapping in Nantahala
Power and Mississippi Power because it sweeps much too broadly. The particular
regulatory needs of public utility holding companies must next be examined as a
possible justification for exclusive SEC jurisdiction.
B. Ohio Power II's Comparative Analysis of FERC and SEC
Regulation: Is Cost-Based Pricing Necessary in the
Interaffiliate Context?
As shown, the cost-trapping rationale does not explain exclusive SEC jurisdic-
tion, and a better rationale is needed. One alternative would be to focus on whether
cost-based pricing is necessary in the context of interaffiliate coal transactions. If
it is, this would justify exclusive SEC jurisdiction. This would also show that the
issue in Ohio Power H was not whether FERC violated the cost-trapping doctrine,
but whether the utilities in public utility holding company systems have particular
needs that should insulate them from FERC regulation generally. In this Section,
this Comment examines the cost-based pricing arguments made by the court of
appeals, and then argues that cost-based pricing is not justified for these transac-
tions because regulatory rulings should not depend upon the corporate form of the
utility. This Section also asserts that the SEC cannot adequately protect consumers
of electricity if it has exclusive jurisdiction over these transactions.
On remand, the court of appeals in Ohio Power II construed the relevant statutes,
orders, and regulations with particular deference toward the cost-based principles
arguably embraced by the SEC. Like the Ohio Power I court, it held that the
specific language of section 13(b) of PUHCA compelled the SEC to price goods
"at cost."'0 3 On the other hand, FERC could point to no specific language in the
FPA beyond the "general charge to establish 'just and reasonable' wholesale
101. Brief for Respondent Federal Energy Regulatory Commission at 20-2 1, Ohio Power 11 (No. 88-
1293) (citing Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 1), 880 F.2d 1400, 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (Mikva,
J., concumng), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990);
Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurrng)).
102. Id. at 27-28 (quoting Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., concumng)).
103. While the SEC has statutory authority under § 13(b) to deviate from the "at cost" standard when
a transaction "involve[s] special or unusual circumstances," PUHCA § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79m(b), the
court noted that the SEC did not elect to invoke this authority. Ohio Power I, 954 F.2d at 785 n.5.
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rates."'1 4 The court reasoned that conflicts between specific and general provi-
sions of the same legislation should be resolved in favor of the specific, 0 5 and
therefore concluded that the SEC's mandate required obeisance.
The court's view that an irreconcilable conflict between the agencies' orders
persisted was buttressed by its view that the SEC's regulations were consistent with
section 13(b) of PUHCA. This analysis resembled the one made in Ohio Power L
For instance, the court found that SEC Rule 90, which prohibits affiliates from
selling goods to each other at "more than cost,""° and Rule 91, which defines
"more than cost" as "not exceed[ing] a fair and equitable allocation of expens-
es,"' 0 7 required cost-based pricing for interaffiliate transactions. Read literally, of
course, these rules plainly do not require such pricing. Nevertheless, the panel
stressed how the SEC orders "embrace the cost-based principles required" by the
SEC rules."i
The SEC has long recognized that interaffiliate coal operations involve significant
capital outlays, and that a "lower-of-cost-or-market interpretation would effectively
eliminate affiliate transactions by preventing investors from keeping profits when
cost is below market (to offset losses when cost is above market)."' 9 As the SEC
argued in its amicus statement, many electric utilities in the 1970s began to rely
more on coal to meet their fuel needs. Because coal operators reneged on long-term
coal supply contracts during the tight market of 1973-1974, utilities like OPCO
were forced to enter into "captive coal operations"-that is, the capitalization of
affiliates to supply coal to secure a long-term supply.'1 0 The resulting danger of
104. Ohio Power If, 954 F.2d at 784.
105. Id. at 784-85 (citing 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.05,
at 105 n.19 (5th ed. 1992)). But see 2A SINGER, supra, § 46.05, at 103 nn.5, 7 (arguing that courts
should construe statutes to "further the intent of the legislature as evidenced by the entire statutory
scheme All parts must be construed together without according undue importance to a single or
isolated portion"). Moreover, one should note the fundamental flaw in the panel's argument. The panel
apparently relied on the fact that PUHCA and the FPA are both part of a single umbrella statute, the
Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935). Yet, Title I of the statute is PUHCA, and Title
II is the FPA, and each agency discharges its responsibilities in identifiably different areas. Moreover,
the legislative history shows that Titles I and II resulted from "two bills separately and independently
drafted," which later were consolidated and introduced in Congress as a single bill. Dozier A. DeVane,
Highlights of Legislative History of the Federal Power Act of 1935 and the Natural Gas Act of 1938,
14 GEO. WASH. L. RaV. 30,37 (1945). Since a strong argument can be made that the case involves very
different pieces of legislation, attributing greater weight to specific language in PUHCA than to general
language in the FPA does not make sense.
106. 17 C.F.R. § 250.90(a)(2) (1992).
107. 17 C.F.R. § 250.91(a).
108. Ohio Power 11, 954 F.2d at 785.
109. Id. at 785 n.6 (citing SEC Amicus Curiae Statement on Remand at 4, Ohio Power II (No. 88-
1293)).
110. SEC Amicus Statement at 3, Ohio Power 11 (No. 88-1293); see also Certificate as to Parties,
Rulings, and Related Cases for Ohio Power Company at 6-7, Ohio Power II (No. 88-1293).
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losing a stable and secure supply of coal "would be detrimental to the interests of
holding company shareholders by rendering the return on OPCO's investment in
SOCCO uncertain at best."''. Thus, according to the SEC, cost-based principles
were necessary within the context of interaffiliate transactions.
However, even if holding companies would face financial difficulty from FERC's
order, it is hard to justify why they would merit special treatment among utilities
generally. Public utilities that are not a part of a holding company still face the
same supply obstacles. Moreover, the usual FERC rate proceeding, which does not
involve the SEC, would "penalize" a regular utility that did not incur costs in a
proper manner by forcing its rates to be "just and reasonable." Thus, under the
court's view, the regulatory review of utilities would depend on whether PUHCA
controlled or not.
Allowing OPCO to pass through the entire cost of its coal to its ratepayers would
make a "regulatory result depend on corporate form and invite[] utilities to use
corporate form as a buffer against regulatory review."".2 Utilities could play hide-
and-seek with regulators, shifting to interaffiliate relationships in order to escape
inhospitable FERC review, then shift back to producing their own coal if SEC
regulation were inhospitable."' Such a holding could lead to a major restructuring
of the electric utility industry, contrary to the statutory goals of PUHCA to prevent
abuses by holding companies. The court's holding encourages other abuses as well,
such as over-capitalization and "gold plating" of plants and equipment." 4
But is this parade of horribles realistic? OPCO argued that if it were true, some
evidence of these claimed abuses would have appeared in the last fifty years, and
none has." s On the other hand, it is likely that no abuses occurred in the past
because it was always anticipated that FERC had the authority to legitimately
intervene. In other words, FERC's perceived regulatory power previously deterred
111. SEC Amicus Statement at 5, Ohio Power If (No. 88-1293). But see Intervenor's Response to
SEC Statement at 4-5, Ohio Powerll(No. 88-1293) (arguing that none of the SEC orders on the OPCO-
SOCCO transactions relied on this rationale and that an October 1978 statement by SEC staff
articulating this rationale deserves no deference because it is a "post hoc rationalization") (citation
omitted). The SEC's position here curiously displays institutional confusion because the SEC had earlier
signed onto FERC's brief in the Arcadia case, which asserted FERC's jurisdiction over OPCO's
wholesale rates.
112. Amici Brief of American Public Power Association (APPA), Consumer Federation of America
and Environmental Action, Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990) (No. 89-1283), quoted
in APPA, Consumer Groups: Big Import in Ohio Power Case at High Court, ELECTRIC UTIL. WK., June
11, 1990, at 4.
113. Id.
114. Ruling Shifts Rate Authority, supra note 5 at II (remarks by Gregg Ottinger, attorney for
municipalities). "Gold-plating" is a slang term used in the utility industry to refer to wasteful spending
on overly expensive plants and equipment.
115. OPCO Brief in Opposition of Cert. Petition at 8, Arcadia (No. 89-1283).
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all abuse. Under this view, the deterrence would evaporate if Ohio Power were to
prevail.
Whether exclusive SEC jurisdiction will lead to manipulation of the corporate
form may depend on how attentive the SEC can be to ratemaking concerns. The
SEC should have to demonstrate as scrupulous attention to ratemaking concerns as
FERC does. Arguably, there are serious voids in the SEC's ability to regulate
holding company transactions with an eye toward just and reasonable ratemakmg.
For instance, the SEC lacks the statutory or administrative procedures by which an
electric power customer can initiate a complaint." 6 Similarly, unlike FERC, the
SEC has no authority to order refunds for overcharges if a utility violates the
SEC's regulatory requirements.'17 Indeed, the SEC recognizes that it "ha[s] no
power over [the] dealings [of electric utilities regulated under PUHCA] with
their customers, retail or wholesale.""' Thus, the SEC is ill-suited to make
decisions that affect ratepayers.
As Justice Stevens noted, the goals and expertise of the two agencies differ
widely."9 Early regulatory history demonstrates that FERC and the SEC may be
too institutionally separate for one to adequately police the statutory concerns of
the other. At the very least, one can discern that there is something not quite right
about the SEC regulating a set of transactions that affect ratepayers of electric
power without the benefit of FERC's expertise.
C. The Regulatory Goals and the History of FERC and the SEC:
A Study in Contrasts
Congress entrusted the administration of PUHCA to the SEC, due to its expertise
in financial transactions and corporate finance. ° It was an apt choice because
PUHCA is directed largely toward financial transactions, acquisition of assets, and
116. Cf. FPA § 206, 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (1988).
117. Cf FPA § 205(3), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(e).
118. Brief for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission as Respondent Supporting Petitioners and
for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 31 n.15, Arcadia (No. 89-1283)
(quoting American Elec. Power Co., 46 S.E.C. 1299, 1323 (1978); accord Louisiana Power& Light Co.,
26 S.E.C. Docket 1422, 1431 (1982); New England Elec. Sys., 24 S.E.C. Docket 298, 308 (1981);
Arkansas Power & Light Co., 45 S.E.C. 567, 574 (1974); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 43
S.E.C. 693, 699 (1968)). But see Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 1), 880 F.2d 1400, 1407 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (arguing that New England Elec. Sys. is an exemption case under § 13(b), specifically, that
the SEC disclaimed jurisdiction in key areas), rev'd and remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio
Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990).
119. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 87-88 (Stevens, J., concurring).
120. Id.
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potential conflicts of interest.12 1 The impetus for the legislation came from the
notorious financial abuses documented in the 1920s by the Federal Trade
Commission, which included the "pyramiding" of control of operating public
utilities through holding compames.'2 In contrast, the FPA arose in the wake of
the regulatory gap created by Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam &
Electric Co., z which held that state regulators had no authority to regulate
interstate wholesale sales of electricity. The federal government had the power to
regulate such sales, but needed an agency to do it. 24 The Federal Power Com-
mission, FERC's predecessor, became that agency.' s Accordingly, the FPA is
directed toward ratemakang issues rather than corporate structure and securities
regulation. 126
It seems far from surprising that a conflict between the aims of the two agencies
would arise, since what enriches investors of a utility could work at crosspurposes
to the interests of ratepayers. The drafters anticipated conflicts. Thus, PUHCA
authorizes the SEC to take regulatory action with respect to holding companies "in
the public interest or for the protection of investors or consumers."'
27
121. See generally Public Utility Holding Company Act: Hearing on H.R. 5220, H.R. 5465, and H.R.
6134 Before Subcomm. on Energy, Conservation, and Power of the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 553, 579-583 (1982) (SEC statement).
122. The Federal Trade Commission report and a congressional committee report detailing abuses
are expressly referred to m PUHCA § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79a(b) (1988).
123. 273 U.S. 83, 86-90 (1927).
124. S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. 17 (1935); H.IL REP. No. 1318, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
7-8 (1935).
125. See Title II of the Public Utility Act of 1935, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803, 838 (1935), for designation
of the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to administer the Act's provisions. In 1977, the FPC ceased
to exist and its functions were transferred to FERC and the Secretary of Energy. Department of Energy
Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977); Exec. Order No. 12,009, 42 Fed. Reg. 46,267
(1977).
126. See Francis X. Welch, Functions of the Federal Power Commission in Relation to the Securities
and Exchange Commission, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 81, 81 (1945) ('[A] cursory glance at the text of
both laws, not to mention their legislative and other historical background, leaves little doubt that the
[SEC]'s task is mainly to look out for the utility security holder, while the [FPCI is supposed to look
out for the utility ratepayer."); see also City of Lafayette v. SEC, 454 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1971), aflfd
sub nom. Gljf States Util. Co. v. FPC, 411 U.S. 747 (1973). In Lafayette, the court of appeals noted
that the SEC did not have regulatory authority over the "operations" of a utility, and the SEC therefore
"stands in a different posture from the FPC, which has regulatory jurisdiction over operations in
view of its authority [over utility rates]." Lafayette, 454 F.2d at 955-56. For a brief discussion of Gulf
States, see supra note 72.
127. See, e.g., PUHCA §§ 10(a), 11(b), 13(b), 15(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 79j, 79k(b), 79m(b), 79o(b)
(1988). Though Arcadia held it inapplicable to this case, FPA § 318 might convey the impression of
a pro-utility investor bias since it gives the SEC precedence over FERC in certain areas of jurisdictional
conflict. See supra note 19. However, § 318 should not be read to prefer the protection of security
14411993]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
The primary question is whether the "public interest" language in PUHCA is
sufficiently consistent with the FPA's charge to make sure rates do not exceed a
"just and reasonable" level. As indicated earlier, PUHCA plainly does not authorize
the SEC to regulate as rigorously as FERC. 2 But OPCO insisted that section
13(b)'s directive "to insure that [contracts between holding company subsidiaries
and their associated companies] are performed economically and efficiently" as
well as "at cost" represents roughly the same protection for ratepayers as does
FERC.
129
Rejecting the view that overturning FERC's order would create a "regulatory
gap," OPCO argued that the SEC's corporate regulatory powers would prevent
utilities within holding companies from integrating vertically into non-utility areas
without regulatory scrutiny. The SEC's plenary authority in this area would
disfavor a holding company's expansion into non-utility business if such an action
were to "tend[] toward[s] interlocking relations or the concentration of control of
public utility companies, of a kind or to an extent detrimental to the public interest
or the interest of investors or consumers,"' 30 or if the business were not "reason-
ably incidental, or economically necessary or appropriate to the operations of such
integrated public utility system."'' While the single mention of "consumers" may
give solace to some, it is a hollow reply to those with substantive concerns over
insuring the existence of just and reasonable rates. Concern over "interlocking
relations," "concentration of control," or a business expansion "reasonably
necessary or appropriate" to operations indicate traditional corporate regulation. By
holders over the more numerous consumers or ratepayers. As Welch explains, § 318 makes no such
choice because it was written in conjunction with PUHCA (as part of the Public Utility Act of 1935),
which envisioned that the SEC's responsibility would recede due to its "liquidating and therefore
temporary character as compared with the more permanent and probably expanding scope of
the [FPC]." Welch, supra note 126, at 84. Under PUHCA § I1, the SEC was purported to be "literally
working itself out of a job," in its duty to break up holding company systems into properties small
enough to be confined within a single state and hence part of intrastate commerce, no longer within the
SEC's jurisdiction. Id. Afterwards, as Welch notes, these smaller utility properties would "come under
the control of the [FPC]" if they established connections with other utilities resulting in interstate
operations. Id. at 86. Seen in this light, Congress intended § 318 to ease the transition of the regulation
of utilities to the FPC on a permanent basis. Id. at 87. While Welch incorrectly predicted that no serious
conflicts would occur between investors under PUHCA and consumers under the FPA, id. at 94-95, and
perhaps overestimated the contraction of the SEC's jurisdiction, his point that the FPA intended no bias
toward either segment of the public interest remains valid. See id. at 95.
128. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
129. PUIHCA § 13(b), 15 U.S.C. § 79m(b).
130. PUHCA, § 10o(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 79j(b)(1).
131. PUHCA § 1l(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(1), cited in Brief of Respondent Ohio Power Company
at 20-21, Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990) (No. 89-1283).
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their very language, these concerns are far removed from ratemaking; they are
instead directed at maintaining corporate rectitude for the benefit of investors.
FERC can intervene into the SEC's price approval process under SEC Rule 23.
Rule 23 requires notice in the Federal Register and an opportunity to comment on
the proposed order or regulation.' In light of the foregoing discussion, however,
this seems inadequate. The SEC's enforcement mechanisms will not fill the
regulatory gap created by the court of appeals in Ohio Power II.
D. The Need for Exclusive FERC Jurisdiction: An Economic Analysis
As discussed above, the SEC cannot effectively safeguard the interests of electric
utility ratepayers because it is primarily concerned with the interests of sharehold-
ers. Only FERC, which is primarily concerned with consumers' interests, can
adequately regulate utilities. Under the scheme laid out by the court of appeals in
Ohio Power 11, a gap would persist between utilities regulated by the SEC and
utilities regulated by FERC. Section 13(b)'s specific "at cost" language should not
carry weight in view of the continued recognition by the courts that FERC is the
arbiter of wholesale electric rates. The courts can prevent the monopolistic behavior
that SEC regulation would cause only by granting FERC exclusive jurisdiction.
Traditional economic theory underlying the regulation of public utilities bears this
out.
Due to economies of scale, utilities are natural monopolies. Because of this, strict
regulation is needed to prevent the undesirable social costs that arise from
monopolistic behavior. If a utility is not regulated, it will maximize its profits by
restricting output and increasing price. As it restricts output, price will rise along
the demand curve (D). (See Diagram.) The monopolist will seek the "profit-
maximizing price" (Pm), which is determined by the price consumers are willing
to pay at the quantity (Qm) where the monopolist's marginal revenue (MR) for each
additional unit of output its equals marginal cost (MC).'
132. 17 C.F.R. § 250.23 (1992). OPCO argued this point and the Ohio Power 11 panel pointed this
out with approval. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 786 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 113 S. Ct. 483 (1992).
133. HERBERT HOVENKAMp, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRusT LAW 16 (1985).
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Such monopoly pricing results in a transfer of wealth from consumers to producers
(rectangle "b-c-e-d") 34 and a "deadweight social loss" (triangle "c-e-f"). 135
To avoid these ill effects, natural monopolies such as utilities must be regulated
in the consumers' interests to keep the price and output of the good at competitive
levels (Pc and Qc, respectively). This results in the most socially efficient outcome
as the largest possible quantity of electricity is produced at the lowest possible
price.
In reality, monopolists usually cannot reach P, and in the case of Ohio Power,
the utility was probably far below it. But if Ohio Power were allowed to pass on
the costs of high-priced coal to consumers, it would behave like a monopolist
134. Economists sometimes refer to this transfer of wealth as a "neutral transfer" because by itself
it has no efficiency implications. Id. at 20. However, consumers are probably not so sanguine about this
loss of wealth.
135. This "deadweight loss" is a measure of the transactions that consumers would have made but
for the pricing practices of the monopolist. Id. at 19-20. HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECO-
NOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 422-23 (1987). These consumers might instead purchase substitute
goods, but such goods necessarily have less social value. This "inefficient substitution" is the social cost
of monopoly. HOVENKAMP, supra note 133, at 20.
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because it would raise its rates above the competitive level. 136 Any price above
P represents a monopoly profit, and deadweight loss ensues. Of course, this
deadweight loss is probably much smaller than triangle "c-e-f," but still not
negligible. As argued in Sections B and C above, 137 the SEC does not pay
sufficient attention to the welfare of consumers, and is not adequately equipped to
do so. Only FERC can safeguard against monopolistic behavior by utilities such as
OPCO. Because of its regulatory mission to advance consumers' interests, FERC
can eliminate deadweight loss better than the SEC.
IV. ARCADIA: THE SUPREME COURT PROVIDES
No WORKABLE STANDARD
The Arcadia Court's approach does not provide a workable standard for lower
courts and could upset the pattern of FERC jurisdiction in other areas of FERC-
SEC overlap. Section A describes the opimon's ambiguous interpretation of section
318 and how this could create inconsistencies among the various courts of appeals.
Section B briefly describes, in a less controversial development, how section 318
will now apply to a narrower range of cases. Section C explores other areas m
which FERC and SEC overlapping jurisdiction could produce litigation over the
validity of FERC's orders. In merger and acquisition cases involving utilities that
are part of public utility holding company systems, recent developments indicate
that FERC's jurisdiction might be threatened as a result of the construction of
section 318 made in the trio of Ohio Power cases. Other areas of overlap are
briefly noted, as are the prospects for legislative reform.
A. A Contradictory Message for the Lower Courts
The Arcadia opinion presents problems because it does not lend sufficient
guidance to the lower courts. It sends contradictory messages and will probably
create much mischief.
The Court's conclusion that FERC and the SEC are not regulating the same
subject matter is rendered meaningless because it simultaneously permitted the
lower court to find that FERC illegally trapped the costs of Ohio Power. The
Arcadia Court made the unfortunate step of reading the cost-trapping doctrine as
articulated in Nantahala Power and Mississippi Power in a vacuum, or at least it
invited lower courts to read it that way. The Supreme Court does not appear
136. In this context, the welfare of utility investors, or stockholders, is the same as the monopolist.
This is necessarily the case in any two dimensional analysis that looks at the outcomes of producers and
consumers.
137. See supra notes 117-33 and accompanying text.
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troubled that a finding of cost trapping could upset the traditional deference given
to FERC in ratemaking matters. While one could plausibly argue that deference to
FERC is somewhat less compelling in the face of another federal statute (in
contrast to state regulations), the Court's opinion avoids any attempt to evaluate the
competing interests represented by the respective regulatory approaches of FERC
and the SEC.' Only Justices Stevens and Marshall recognized the regulatory
consequences of FERC jurisdiction on the one hand, and the SEC on the other.'39
While the D.C. Circuit limited the scope of FERC's regulatory powers, the
Arcadia opinion still allows lower courts the freedom to find for the agency based
on a more faithful reading of the cost-trapping doctrine as expressed in Nantahala
Power and Mississippi Power Justice Scalia wrote somewhat equivocally that the
court of appeals on remand has "available the argument that the FERC-
prescribed rate - 'traps' costs" and disregards a "governmental assurance,
possibly implicit in the SEC approvals." 40 Thus, it is not hard to imagine that
other circuit courts will find Arcadia a pliable enough standard and will judiciously
refrain from adopting the cost-trapping rationale, thus posing a conflict with Ohio
Power II. Since the Supreme Court did not adequately set a standard, it will
probably have to revisit the question.
B. The Limited Applicability of Section 318 of the Federal Power Act
A more concrete command of Arcadia is the new, limited applicability of section
318. Because the Court interpreted this section to settle jurisdictional battles in only
four specific areas of regulation,' 4' parties are not free to invoke this section as
they once might have been. 42 While the Supreme Court's construction of section
318 may not square with the previous understanding of the section or with its
legislative history, Arcadia does not appear to have contradicted any previous court
decisions on the matter. However, since neither party at any stage even suggested
138. As noted earlier, supra note 64, this is a direct consequence of Justice Scalia's textualist
approach to statutory interpretation.
139. Not all of the remaining members of that Court were necessarily afflicted with the majority's
disability. Justice Souter took no part in the consideration of this case. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co.,
498 U.S. 73, 86 (1990).
140. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 79-80; see also supra notes 22, 63 and accompanying text.
142. Already, FERC has taken heed of the Supreme Court's construction of§ 318. In City of Auburn
v. Indiana Michigan Power Co. (In re Indiana & Michigan Municipal Distributors Association), 59 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) $ 61,260 (June 3, 1992), FERC rejected the argument that FERC
must yield to the-SEC under § 318 regarding "accounting conventions in rate treatment." Id. at 61,959-
60 (relying on a longstanding doctrine announced in Alabama-Tennessee Natural Gas Co. v. FPC, 359
F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 847 (1966)). FERC held that Arcadia reinforced the
view that § 318 did not grant SEC jurisdiction over this area because it "limited the applicability of [§
318." Id. at 61,960.
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that section 318 alid not apply, 4 1 the precedential force of the opinion could be
questioned on the narrow ground that no valid precedent obtains when the Court
decides a point of law based on arguments not raised by the litigants.'"
C. Additional Effects of the Ohio Power & Arcadia Litigation
Besides illuminating the issue over whether exclusive SEC jurisdiction will tend
to help or hurt consumers, the Ohio Power litigation contributes to the developing
understanding of how SEC-FERC relations in general will develop. The Arcadia
opinion's interpretation of section 318 could affect a variety of cases involving
overlapping jurisdiction between FERC and the SEC, most notably in mergers and
acquisitions. The Ohio Power opinions also contribute to this development.
1. Merger & Acquisition Cases and the Central Vermont Doctrine
The Ohio Power-Arcadia trio of cases creates nagging doubts about recent FERC
orders asserting jurisdiction in mergers and acquisitions involving utilities. The
FPA, under section 203, gives FERC jurisdiction over any "public utility" that
"dispose[s]" in any manner any of its "facilities."' 45 In such cases, FERC must
143. Arcadia, 498 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., concumng).
144. Justice Scalia's Arcadia opinion "never explained or justified what it did." Independent Ins.
Agents of Am. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 742 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silberman, J., dissenting) (citing Arcadia
to support argument that courts improperly create controversies when they inquire into issues not raised
by the parties; such inquiry exceeds the courts' "constitutional duty to decide cases and controversies").
As such, the Arcadia Court did not mean to establish a precedent on the point. Id. Thus, under Judge
Silberman's view, courts that decide issues not raised do not mean to establish precedents, and if they
are asserted as such, courts should ignore them.
But according to ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 363-68 (6th ed. 1986), this
interpretation is not necessarily warranted. Even though Supreme Court Rule 21.1(a) states that the Court
will only consider questions raised or fairly included in the petition, this rule is created by the Court and
can be waived when other considerations outweigh the "reasonable procedures" embodied by the rule.
Id. at 364. In most cases cited by the authors, however, the Court explains why it departs from its rule,
and there is a fairly well-developed list of exceptions for doing so. Here, of course, the Arcadia Court
gave no reason for its decision to rely on unraised issues, which could cause some suspicion. But, at
bottom, the authors note that when the Court "believes there is sufficient reason to address the point
despite its omission the Court may do just that." Id. at 368. Thus, there might be no reason to have
such a confined view of Arcadia's authority as precedent. Moreover, recent authority appears to
reinforce this notion. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1718 (1991) (relying on
Arcadia to hold that courts not limited to particular legal theories advanced by parties); see also
McCleskey v. Zant, IlII S. Ct. 1454, 1460 (1991); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989); Batson
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84-85 n.4 (1986), all cited in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., Ill
S. Ct. 1647, 1658 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (protesting Court's refusal to reach issues raised only
by amict and also citing Arcadia).
145. Section 203(a) provides in pertinent part as follows:
No public utility shall sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of the whole of its facilities subject to
the jurisdiction of the Commission, or any part thereof of a value in excess of $50,000, or by
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authorize such dispositions. In a recent line of cases beginning with Central
Vermont Public Service Corp., 4 FERC broadened its authority under section
203. It determined that a disposition occurs when a public utility transfers the
ownership and control of its jurisdictional facilities via sale of stock. Prior to
Central Vermont, FERC viewed section 203 as applicable only to transactions
involving sales of real and personal utility property, but not to stock transac-
tions.'47 Thus, FERC explicitly reversed its earlier decisions disclaimmg jurisdic-
tion when the disposition involved stock transactions transferring the ownership and
control of the utility to a separate corporate entity. 4 ' Since none of the cases
utilizing the new doctrine have been reviewed, their validity remains uncertain. 49
Greater danger might lurk in Savannah Electric & Power Co., in which FERC
asserted jurisdiction over Savannah Electric's disposition of its facilities via the sale
of its stock to The Southern Company, a holding company registered under
PUHCA."'5 In justifying its jurisdiction over the transaction, FERC responded to
the view of Savannah Electric and The Southern Company that section 318 of the
FPA deprived FERC of jurisdiction by arguing, in part, that section 318 applied
only when the same subject matter was involved. To support this proposition,
FERC cited Ohio Power Co., the 1987 FERC opinion that provoked the litigation
any means whatsoever, directly or indirectly, merge or consolidate such facilities or any part
thereof with those of any other person, or purchase, acquire, or take any security of any other
public utility, without having first secured an order of the Commission authorizing it to do so
FPA § 023(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1988) (emphasis added).
146. 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,295, at 61,960 (June 1, 1987).
147. Id.
148. Id., accord Central Illinois Pub. Serv. Co., 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,073
(Jan. 25, 1988); Savannah Elec. & Power Co, 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep (CCH) 161,240 (Feb.
29, 1988). The earlier decisions that Central Vermont reversed include Iowa Southern Utilities Co., 35
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) T 61,149 (May 2, 1986); Texas-New Mexico Power Co., 28 Fed.
Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 161,079 (July 23, 1984); Sierra Pacific Power Co., 27 Fed. Energy Comm'n
Rep. (CCH) T 61,081 (Apr. 13, 1984); and Iowa Power & Light Co., 9 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep.
(CCH) T 61,099 (Oct. 25, 1979).
149. In Arcadia, the Registered Holding Companies challenged the validity of FERC's assertion of
jurisdiction in Central Illinois, 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 9 61,073 and Savannah
Electric, 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) T 61,240. The Companies argued that FERC had
incorrectly reversed the earlier decisions, and this contributed to an erroneous interpretation of § 318
by FERC. Registered Holding Companies Brief at 26-27, Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S.
73 (1990) (No. 89-1283). Yet, FERC-as well as other federal agencies-receives substantial deference
from reviewing courts on the grounds of agency expertise. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (stating that federal agencies are "presumably equipped or informed to deal
with a specialized field of knowledge [and thus] carry the authority of an expertness which courts do
not possess and therefore must respect").
150. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,778. In
Savannah Electric, FERC relied on Central Vermont as precedential authority. Id.
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at issue. 5' Of course, FERC's construction of section 318 failed m Ohio Power
I,152 and the agency lost again in Ohio Power II. FERC's reliance on Ohio Power
Co. triggers concern because the controversy in Savannah Electric resembles the
issues litigated in the trio of cases discussed in this Comment.
In Savannah Electric, FERC insisted that Savannah Electric's disposition of
utility assets was a different subject matter than The Southern Company's
acquisition of utility assets. Yet, the Ohio Power I court assailed such logic when
it decided that FERC and the SEC were indeed regulating the same subject matter,
since FERC's order reformed "in effect" the SEC's coal price regulation, if not "in
fact."'53 Accordingly, Savannah Electric might represent another instance in
which FERC is guilty of elevating "form" over "substance" in an attempt to justify
its continued jurisdiction. 4 However, a good argument could be made that since
Arcadia reversed Ohio Power I by holding that FERC and the SEC were regulating
different subject matters-rates versus the price of coal 55-- there is little contro-
versy in FERC's assertion of jurisdiction based on its view that it was regulating
a different subject manner than did the SEC. Despite this compelling point, the
Arcadia decision does not speak precisely to the issue in Savannah Electric, which
is whether dispositions of jurisdictional utilities via stock transactions are a proper
subject of FERC regulation. FERC contended that Savannah Electric disposed of
"utility assets" through the sale of stock, while The Southern Company acquired
151. Id. at 61,779 & n.24 (citing Ohio Power Co., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
61,098 (Apr. 30, 1987)).
152. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 1), 880 F.2d 1400, 1405-08 (D.C. Cir. 1989), rev'd and
remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990).
153. Id. at 1409 (discussing issue in context of a trapped costs rationale); see infra notes 160-62 and
accompanying text (discussing a cost-trapping rationale or analogy that could be used to justify, however
inappropriately in light of the views expressed in this Comment, divesting FERC ofjurisdiction in cases
like Savannah Electric).
154. As Electric Utility Week put it, FERC "had [in Ohio Power 1] put too fine a point on the
language of Section 318," thus casting doubt on the validity of Savannah Electric. This comment was
made in a report on the controversy over whether FERC could validly assertjunsdiction in the Northeast
Utilities-Public Service New Hampshire merger. The report noted that in light of Ohio Power I, FERC
might have to revisit Savannah Electric. Competitive, Jurisdictional Issues Face FERC in NU/PSNH
Merger Case, ELEcTRic UTIL. WK., Jan. 29, 1990, at 10 [hereinafter NUIPSNHMerger]. The NU/PSNH
merger did not present the same clean set of facts that raised questions about FERC's jurisdiction in
Savannah Electric, Central Illinois, and Central Vermont. In the NU/PSNH case, FERC jurisdiction was
ultimately noncontroversial because the rate contracts involved clearly triggered FERC's jurisdiction.
Moreover, the parties did not challenge FERC jurisdiction. NU/PSNH Merger, at 10; see also Northeast
Utils. Serv. Co., 56 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,269 (Aug. 9, 1991) (noting that
FERC's jurisdiction not disputed). Thus, the NU/PSNH merger is distinguishable, and provides no
reassurance that FERC will be able to overcome a challenge to its § 203 authority in the context of
overlapping SEC jurisdiction.
155. See Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 84 (1990).
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a different subject matter, "utility securities.' 56 Admittedly, however, Arcadia
does point in the direction of viewing these, too, as different subject matters.
To be safe, FERC defended the Savannah Electric order on additional grounds.
Section 318 applies only when one "person" is subject to both the FPA and
PUHCA. In Savannah Electric, FERC argued that Savannah Electric is a separate
"person" from The Southern Company, and is not subject to the Holding Company
Act. Because it is a utility, Savannah Electric is only subject to the FPA.'5 7 This
argument, too, is vulnerable to the criticism of elevating form over substance. After
all, Savannah Electric will become subject to PUHCA once the acquisition is
finalized.
Similarly, FERC argued that because no conflict in fact existed between FERC's
jurisdiction and the SEC's, section 318 was not triggered. Of course, this argument
is ripe for ambush by any court that takes seriously the cost-trapping rationale in
Ohio Power I. The cost-trapping rationale can be read broadly enough so that an
analogy to cost trapping could negate FERC jurisdiction.
A cost-trapping "analogy" would siguify a regulatory agency's inability to
regulate an entity already subject to regulation by another regulatory agency. If the
regulation by the second agency would "affect[] the economic relationship" of the
entity approved by the first agency, 5 ' or "reform[] the agreement" made by the
entity, 5 9 it creates excess costs for the regulated entity In the Savannah Electric
context, the accusation would be that FERC's jurisdiction, if ultimately an
impediment to the transaction, would reform the OPCO agreements first approved
by the SEC.' 60
FERC's "no conflict" argument had familiar overtones. It laid out the different
goals of the two agencies by stressing that FERC protects "the interests of
ratepayers and ensure[s] reliable and adequate service" while the SEC polices
industry structure.' 6' While these are excellent reasons, a court adopting the Ohio
Power I or 11 approach could readily find that a decision based on differing agency
purposes was not the best reason for concluding that no conflict occurred.
The salient fact in Savannah Electric was that FERC happened to approve the
disposition..If FERC had rejected Savannah Electric's proposal, its claim that its
156. Savannah Elec. & Power Co., 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,240, at 61,779
(Feb. 29, 1988).
157. Id.
158. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 11), 954 F.2d 779, 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 483 (1992).
159. Ohio Power Co. v. FERC (Ohio Power 1), 880 F.2d 1400, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1989), revd and
remanded sub nom. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73 (1990).
160. This illustrates a most troublesome aspect of the Ohio Power litigation: the decision to grant
the SEC exclusive jurisdiction seems to turn on the SEC issuing its order ahead of FERC.
161. Savannah Elec., 42 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) at 61,779 & n.25.
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jurisdiction did not conflict with the SEC's would have been more difficult to
justify, because the SEC had already approved The Southern Company's acquisition
proposal. 6 2 Thus, no conflict occurred because FERC came out the "right" way.
Had FERC disapproved Savannah Electric's disposition, it would be difficult to
imagine a more stark example of one agency "reforming an agreement" between
Savannah Electric and The Southern Company "in effect" '63 or "affecting the
economic relationship" between Savannah Electric and The Southern Company, "a
relationship approved by, and under the jurisdiction of, the SEC."'"
Even though it is true that Ohio Power I was partly dismantled by Arcadia, and
that section 318 will not in the future govern FERC-SEC disputes stemming from
interaffiliate coal transactions, 6 " the course of this litigation shows a proclivity
on the part of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals to defer to the SEC. Herein lies
the danger. Even without the aid of section 318, the court utilized a cost-trapping
rationale to preserve the SEC's jurisdiction. The result of Ohio Power II plays
havoc with FERC's recent jurisprudence because it allows Ohio Power Ito reassert
itself. Ohio Power Ps view that different subject matters were the same could pave
the way for its return in the form of a cost-trapping analogy, if that analogy is
broadly construed.
Put another way, the cost-trapping principles of Ohio Power 1I can be used to
diminish FERC's authority under section 203. By broadly applying these principles,
FERC's assertion of jurisdiction under section 203 could be challenged as
"reforming" the agreement already approved by the SEC. 66 As such, this
reasoning could overturn a line of FERC cases involving the disposition of assets
by public utilities that fall under FERC's jurisdiction. 67 Unfortunately, such a
result ignores the legislative purposes behind the enactment of the Federal Power
Act.
162. Id. at 61,778 & n.8.
163. Ohio Power 1, 880 F.2d at 1409.
164. Ohio Power 11, 954 F.2d at 784 (citations omitted).
165. Arcadia, Ohio v. Ohio Power Co., 498 U.S. 73, 84-85 (1990).
166. The cost-trapping rationale in Ohio Power II as applied to these merger situations ultimately
seems to boil down to granting the SEC exclusive junsdiction simply because it issued its order before
FERC did. This result is completely arbitrary, yet an inescapable aspect of this rationale. If FERC had
issued its order first, would not a subsequent SEC order "affect the economic relationship" between the
regulated entity and its affiliate?
167. At least some indication that holding companies will look for opportunities to challenge the
holding of Savannah Electric and its predecessors is evidenced in Registered Holding Companies Brief
at 25, Arcadia (No. 89-1283). In the course of disputing FERC's interpretation of § 318, the Holding
Companies argued that Savannah Electric and Central Illinois were incorrectly decided. Id. at 26.
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2. Other Possible Areas of Litigation and Requests for Reform
The Ohio Power decisions could jeopardize other areas of traditional FERC
regulation. For example, FERC cases ruling on the allocation of taxes when holding
company affiliates file consolidated tax returns could be overturned based on a
cost-trapping analogy, which is available in light of Ohio Power 1.168 In fact,
cases that involve any kind of nonpower costs on a holding company system could
be affected.
69
State utility regulators have also responded by voicing their concerns that Ohio
Power II will create confusion, increase jurisdictional tensions, and increase foram
shopping in the regulation of holding companies by FERC, the SEC, and state
regulatory commissions. The National Association of State Regulatory Comrmssion-
ers recently proposed a "summit conference" to jointly address the "jurisdictional
challenges" posed by Ohio Power, compliance with the new Clean Air Act
Amendments, and other relevant questions. 7 1 In this context, it is important to
note that as FERC's responsibility expands under new legislation, the potential for
conflict with the SEC will grow.
Furthermore, consumer groups are lobbying to give FERC jurisdiction over
holding company mergers in the wake of some recent merger cases. Concern
emanates from Missouri Basin Municipal Power Agency v. Midwest Energy
Co., 7 1 where FERC disclaimed jurisdiction over the merger of two holding
companies that owned public utilities. FERC claimed that under FPA section 203
it did not have jurisdiction because the holding companies were not "public
utilities" and thus not within the statute. However, FERC noted that if and when
the holding companies decided to consolidate their respective utilities, FERC would
assert jurisdiction." Eventually, the new holding company merged its two
subsidiary utilities and FERC, over the holding company's challenge, asserted
jurisdiction!73 FERC approved the merger. While the jurisdictional issue in this
168. An SEC rule that holds that no taxes may be allocated to any member of a holding company
that exceed what would have been paid if it had filed taxes alone could insulate holding companies from
FERC ratemaking decisions affecting such allocations. Ruling Shifts Rate Authority, supra note 5, at I I
(comment by James Liberman, attorney for Registered Holding Company Group).
169. Observation made by an unnamed attorney following the Ohio Power 11 decision. Id. The same
article noted that Ohio Power II "could have broad implications." Id.
170. States, SEC and FERC Need to Be on Same Page to Regulate, INSIDE FERC, Mar. 16, 1992,
at 17 (quoting Mar. 9, 1992, letter by Ashley Brown, Chairman of the National Association of
Regulatory Commissioners' Electricity Committee, to FERC and the SEC).
171. 53 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,368 (Dec. 13, 1990), reh'g denied, 55 Fed.
Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH) 61,464 (June 21, 1991).
172. Id. at 62,299.
173. FERC Okays Merger of Iowa Utilities; Rejects Argument Over Jurisdiction, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WK., July 20, 1992, at 5.
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case seems like a clear winner for FERC, the new holding company, Midwest
Resources, may have been emboldened to challenge jurisdiction because of the
recent erosion in FERC's authority.
Although consumers appear nervous about utility holding company mergers and
desire FERC regulation, 74 there is no reason for FERC to extend its jurisdiction
to these mergers as long as it retains authority over the merger of jurisdictional
entities-public utilities. As long as FERC rebuffs challenges to its traditional
regulatory authority, as it did to Midwest Resources' challenge, there is no danger
that consumer protection will erode in this context.
CONCLUSION
The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, with help from the Supreme Court, has
granted the SEC exclusive jurisdiction in an area of transactions that could do
significant damage to the interests of consumers, resulting in a net loss to society
The courts failed to understand the legislative scheme constructed by Congress to
regulate the electric power industry. Furthermore, due to Arcadia's ambiguous
mandate, relitigation of these issues seems likely. If the Ohio Power II decision is
allowed to stand, the prospects for future erosion of FERC jurisdiction in areas of
overlap with the SEC seem significant. Courts, however, have the power to avoid
the results of Ohio Power I & If by paying closer attention to the legislative
purposes behind the creation of FERC and the SEC.
Perhaps a greater concern is the courts' ability to handle the issues presented by
the Ohio Power litigation. Due to the courts' shortcomings described herein, serious
questions are raised as to whether the Supreme Court is competent to exercise
judicial review in cases involving complex federal legislation. The Court may not
have the necessary familiarity to appropriately handle these complex regulatory
matters. While one would hesitate to make a major change in the Court's
jurisdiction based on a critique of one case, proposals to institute an intermediate
level of review between the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court have
sporadically recurred over the past two decades.'75 While concerns over an
174. NASUCA Seeks Law Giving FERC a Role in Utility Holding Company Mergers, ELECTRIC UTIL.
WK., July 13, 1992, at 8 (expressing concern over the merger of holding companies IE Industries and
Iowa Southern Inc., which did not seek FERC approval). (NASUCA is the National Association of State
Utility Consumer Advocates.)
175. See, e.g., COMMISSION ON REVISiON OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE
AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted in 67 F.R.D. 195, 199, 208
(1975) (popularly known as the Hruska Commission Report); FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, REPORT OF
THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT, reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573, 590, 611
(1972) (popularly known as the Freund Commission Report); Warren E. Burger, Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary, 69 A.B.A. J. 442, 447 (1983).
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excessive workload provoked these proposals, competency or familiarity concerns,
although different, are probably related. Despite recent reports that the caseload
under Chief Justice Rehnquist has declined significantly, 76 critics have reiterated
the claim that a structural change is needed because the Supreme Court "simply
lacks the capacity to insure the stability, clarity, and uniformity of the huge body
of national law being interpreted and applied in many thousands of state and
federal court cases each year."'" This observation is particularly pertinent to
statutory cases like Arcadia, a case lacking the glamour or media attention of cross-
burning, nude dancing, or abortion rights cases. It may well be the lack of media
attention that explains why the Court "drops the ball" in a case like Arcadia.
One commentator recently maintained that the Court has not given sufficient
guidance in the area of tax and business law, and proposed increased specialization
of the appellate system.' If a few discrete areas of law were given to a national
court of appeals, such as business, tax, or public utilities, the Court could avoid
deciding these technical and complex questions. As a result, a consistent and stable
body of law with adequate protections for consumers would develop. 7 9
176. In the October, 1990, term, the Court issued 112 signed opinions, its fewest since 1970. This
was down from a high of 151 in 1982 and 1983. Robert J. Giuffra, Jr., The Rehnquist Court After Five
Terms, N.Y. L.J. July 30, 1991, at Al. The number of decisions was set to drop further to 109 in the
next term, which ended in June, 1992. Linda Greenhouse, Lightening Scales of Justice: High Court
Trims Its Docket, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 7, 1992, at Al.
177. PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL CouRrs AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1875 (3rd ed. 1988) (paraphrasing the critics).
178. Paul Bator, What Is Wrong with the Supreme Court?, 51 U. Pri. L. Ruv. 673, 684, 695 (1990);
see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV.
L. REv. 1400, 1405-07, 1414 (1987) (noting that huge growth in the number of appellate judgments
since 1960 has made federal law less uniform than ever, Intercircuit Panel needed to address intercircuit
conflicts).
179. See Bator, supra note 178, at 695.
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